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Women in developing countries suﬀer from gender inequal-
ities. Countries like Yemen, Chad, and Pakistan have been
ranked at the bottom of the World Economic Forum’s Global
Gender Gap Index. In Indonesia, for example, 96% of men are
literate, but only 90% of women are; 86% of men participate in
the labor market, but only 53% of women do; men earn US$
6,903 on average, but women earn only US$ 2,985; only one in
ﬁve legislators, senior oﬃcials, and managers are women; one
in ten married women are 15–19 years old; maternal mortality
rate may be as high as one in four hundred live births (World
Economic Forum, 2013).
Gender norms that subjugate women in the developing
world are one of the reasons behind these persisting gender
inequalities (Agarwal, 1994; Sullivan, 1994). Patriarchy and
traditional cultures in Asia, for example, hand more resources
and power to men, which lead to women’s lack of access to
education, healthcare facilities, and labor markets. Perhaps
the most abhorrent manifestation of these gender inequalities
is what Sen (1990) terms “missing women”, the shortfall of
women relative to men that would have lived had they had
equal access to survival-related goods.
We can empower women, the theoretical literature points
out, by strengthening their threat options—resources that
women can control and opportunities outside their households
they can exploit (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993; Manser & Brown,
1980; McElroy & Horney, 1981). The empirical literature also
seems to support this claim. For example, Pitt, Khandker, and
Cartwright (2006), using instrumental variables (IV) tech-
niques, ﬁnd that access to microﬁnance in Bangladesh
improves women’s decision-making authority, freedom of
mobility, and social networks. Using regression-control strat-
egies, Allendorf (2007) and Panda and Agarwal (2005) ﬁnd
that, in Nepal and India, respectively, women’s ownership of
land increases women’s decision-making authority and lowers
their risk of experiencing marital violence. 1
In this paper, we focus on the eﬀects of education on
women’s empowerment. Education may increase women’s
bargaining power within their households because it endows
them with knowledge, skills, and resources to make life choices
that improve their welfare (Duﬂo, 2012; Lundberg & Pollak,
1993). Estimation of the eﬀects of education on empowerment,428however, is diﬃcult because women’s preferences, family
background, and community characteristics that aﬀect both
education and empowerment may be unobserved (Duﬂo,
2012). If these unobserved characteristics correlate with educa-
tion and women’s empowerment, ordinary least square esti-
mates of the eﬀects of education will be biased. One way to
solve this problem is to exploit sources of variation in educa-
tion that are unrelated to women’s characteristics and empow-
erment.
Some recent papers that exploit exogenous sources of varia-
tion in education ﬁnd that education lowers fertility, but evi-
dence on other aspects of empowerment is scant. Osili and
Long (2008) and Breierova and Duﬂo (2004), for example, ﬁnd
education lowers fertility in Nigeria and Indonesia, respec-
tively. Mocan and Cannonier (2012) show, in Sierra Leone,
education lowers women’s desired number of children and
increases their use of contraceptives and likelihood of being
tested for the human immunodeﬁciency virus (HIV). However,
using regression discontinuity (RD) designs, McCrary and
Royer (2011) do not ﬁnd education lowers fertility in the Uni-
ted States. On other aspects of empowerment, Mocan and
Cannonier (2012) also ﬁnd education lowers women’s toler-
ance for practices that hurt their wellbeing.
We exploit an exogenous variation in schooling induced by
a longer school year in Indonesia in 1978. Individuals who
were born in 1971 or earlier experienced the longer school year
in 1978 if they did not drop out of schools earlier; individuals
who were born later did not. There is, therefore, a discontinu-
ity in the probability of experiencing the longer school year
between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts, which ﬁts a fuzzy RD
design. Parinduri (2014) shows, using this fuzzy RD design,
the longer school year increases years of schooling; in this
paper, we focus on women and examine whether the exoge-
nous increase in women’s education aﬀects their empower-
ment.
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increases contraceptive use, and promotes reproductive health
practices. However, except for a few outcome measures, we do
not ﬁnd evidence that education improves women’s decision-
making authority, asset ownership, or community participa-
tion.
We contribute to the literature in three respects. One, we pro-
vide the causal eﬀects of education on women’s empowerment
using a natural experiment that ﬁts an RD design, which com-
plements papers in the literature that use instrumental variable
techniques. 2 In a system of three equations, we use the discon-
tinuity between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts as an instrumental
variable for treatment status (experiencing the longer school
year) in the ﬁrst-stage regressions. In the second stage, we use
the predicted value of the treatment status to estimate the
eﬀects of the longer school year on education. In the third
stage, we use the predicted value of education from the sec-
ond-stage regressions to estimate the eﬀects of education on
women’s empowerment. We compare women who, conditional
on their year of birth, experienced the longer school year with
those who did not, women who had similar characteristics
except for the exposure to the longer school year. The RD
design, therefore, provides good counterfactuals to estimate
the eﬀects of education on women’s empowerment. Two, we
analyze Indonesia, a middle-income country, which comple-
ments papers on women’s empowerment in poor countries like
Bangladesh, Nepal, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone whose socio-
economic and cultural setups diﬀer from Indonesia’s. 3 Our
results would suggest whether education improves women’s
empowerment in developing countries whose incomes are
higher. The fact that we do not ﬁnd evidence that education
improves women’s decision-making authority, asset owner-
ship, and community participation indicates that education
and economic development alone, without changes in cultural
beliefs and attitudes on gender relations, may be insuﬃcient to
empower women in developing countries, particularly in Asia.
Three, we examine the eﬀects of education on various measures
of empowerment such as fertility, contraceptive use, reproduc-
tive health practices, decision-making authority, asset owner-
ship, and community participation, not only on fertility and
reproductive health practices that papers in this line of litera-
ture have focused on.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 describes the longer school
year. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy and the data.
Section 4 discusses the results and robustness checks. Section 5
concludes.2. THE LONGER SCHOOL YEAR AND INDONESIA’S
EDUCATION POLICIES
(a) The longer school year
The government of Indonesia implemented a longer school
year in 1978 to change the start of the academic year. The aca-
demic year had run from January to December, but in 1978, to
synchronize the academic year with the government budget
year, the IndonesianMinister of Education andCulture, Daoed
Yusuf, changed the start of the school year from January to
July. To achieve this objective, he required schools to lengthen
the 1978 academic year until June 1979. Therefore, childrenwho
attended schools in the 1978 academic year completed their
grades not in December 1978, but in June 1979: They remained
in the same grades for an extended period of six months. 4
Community leaders and some lawmakers opposed the
change; they argued the government should not changeeducation policies haphazardly as Daoed Yusuf and his prede-
cessors had done (he announced the change in June 1978, in
the middle of the 1978 academic year.) Parent associations
opposed it too because, among others, they worried that chil-
dren had become the guinea pigs of every education ministers’
desire to change education policies. Parents also protested
against the additional costs they had to incur because Daoed
Yusuf reduced tuition fees by only 50% during the extended
term, and it applied to students in public schools only
(Tempo, 1978).
Despite the opposition, Daoed Yusuf went ahead and chan-
ged the start of the school year by requiring students who
attended schools in 1978 to remain in the same grades until
June 1979. He did not provide new teaching materials; he
did not change the curriculum either. Rather, he asked teach-
ers to revise materials that they had covered in 1978 (MPKRI,
1978; Tempo, 1978), which, in eﬀect, makes the six-month
extension in 1979 resemble a one-time longer school year.
There are several mechanisms through which a one-time
expansion of the school year may increase educational attain-
ment. One, the longer school year increases the students’ stock
of human capital however small it may be, which lowers the
probability of grade repetition (Parinduri, 2014; Pischke,
2007). Two, an increase in instructional time helps under-per-
forming students because it gives them opportunities to spend
more time on a particular task and allows them to have a dee-
per coverage of the curriculum (Cooper, Nye, Charlton,
Lindsay, & Greathouse, 1996; Patal, Cooper, & Allen, 2010).
Three, students from low-income households beneﬁt from
more instructional time because they have less access to educa-
tional services outside of schools (Cooper et al., 1996). Four,
the extension requires teachers to revise materials, which gives
students opportunities to retain information and consequently
learn better (Cooper et al., 1996). The less time there is
between the two terms, the greater the student’s ability to
retain information and perform better, and the less likely they
are to experience learning loss (Coley, 2002; Hart & Risley,
1995; Neuman, 1996; Smith & Brewer, 2007). Five, a longer
school year fosters a stronger student–teacher relationship
because it allows teachers to use new ways to engage students
(Cooper et al., 1996). Teachers who build positive relation-
ships with their students create classroom environments that
are more conducive to learning and that meet not only
student’s academic needs but also their developmental and
emotional needs.
(b) Indonesia’s education policies
The government of Indonesia implemented three other edu-
cation policies in the 1970s and early 1980s, but none of them
compromises the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of the longer
school year on education. One, the government implemented
the Inpres primary school program, an expansion of access
to primary schools that Suharto’s administration launched in
1974 and slowed down in 1983. The government built 56,000
primary schools during the second ﬁve-year development plan
from 1974–75 to 1978–79 budget years and about 75,000 pri-
mary schools during the third ﬁve-year development plan from
1979–80 to 1983–84 (Government of Indonesia, 1985). The
Inpres program, therefore, did not aﬀect students who entered
primary schools around the 1978–79 academic years diﬀer-
ently—it does not compromise the identiﬁcation of the longer
school year using the RD design.
Two, the government abolished primary school fees for the
ﬁrst three grades in 1977 and for the last three grades in 1978
(Chernichovsky & Meesook, 1985). This policy aﬀected
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include both individuals who experienced and those who did
not experience the longer school year. Moreover, the policy
would increase enrollment due to a reduction in schooling
costs, not reduce enrollment like the longer school year might
have in 1979–80 academic year. Therefore, this policy does not
compromise the identiﬁcation of the eﬀects of the longer
school year.
Three, the government announced a compulsory six-year
schooling policy in 1984 (Suryadarma, Suryahadi, Sumarto,
& Rogers, 2006). It is, however, just an announcement and
the government announced it long after the implementation
of the longer school year in 1978–79.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
(a) Empirical strategy
We exploit an exogenous variation in years of schooling
induced by a longer school year in Indonesia in 1978, which
ﬁts a regression discontinuity (RD) design, to identify the
eﬀects of education on women’s empowerment. 5
Because whether a woman experienced the longer school
year is not a deterministic function of her year of birth, we
have a fuzzy RD design. Women who were born in 1972 or
later did not experience the longer school year because they
had not entered primary schools in 1978 when the government
implemented the longer school year; women who were born in
1971 or earlier experienced the longer school year, but only if
they did not drop out of school before 1978. Therefore, condi-
tional on the year of birth, there is a discontinuity in the prob-
ability of experiencing the longer school year between the 1971
and 1972 cohorts, which we use as an instrumental variable for
the treatment status, the longer school year, in a fuzzy RD
design.
We implement the fuzzy RD design as a system of three
equations as follows. Let Di denote the treatment status, the
longer school year, which indicates whether woman i experi-
enced the longer school year. Using an indicator older cohorts,
Ti, that equals one for the 1971 and older cohorts and zero
otherwise as an instrumental variable for Di, we can write
the ﬁrst-stage equation as:
Di ¼ aþ bT i þ f ðyobiÞ þ e1i ð1Þ
where f(yobi) is a polynomial function of yobi, the year of birth
of woman i. The second-stage equation-by-equation two-stage
least square (2SLS) estimation of the eﬀects of the longer
school year on education is:
edui ¼ cþ dbDi þ f ðyobiÞ þ e2i ð2Þ
where edui is a measure of educational outcomes of woman i,
and bDi is the predicted value woman i’s treatment status from
Eqn. (1). The third-stage of the equation-by-equation 2SLS
estimation of the eﬀects of education on women’s empower-
ment is then,
Y i ¼ cþ hdedui þ f ðyobiÞ þ e3i ð3Þ
where Yi is a measure of empowerment of woman i, anddedui is
the predicted value of her educational outcome from Eqn. (2).
If education improves women’s empowerment, we expect
the coeﬃcient ofdedui in Eqn. (3) to be negative for the number
of live births and positive for contraceptive use, reproductive
health practices, decision-making authority, ownership of
assets, and community participation.(b) DataWe use the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS), a longitu-
dinal survey of a representative sample of the Indonesian pop-
ulation initiated by the RAND Corporation. 6 To have the
largest sample of women who completed high school, we use
the latest wave of the survey, IFLS-4, done in 2007. To ensure
the older cohorts (those born in 1971 or earlier) had some like-
lihood of experiencing the longer school year in 1978 and the
younger cohorts (those born in 1972 or later) had completed
high schools when they were interviewed in 2007, we include
women born in the period of 1960–87, which gives us a sample
size of 22,197 women. 7
We deﬁne the older cohorts, Ti, equals one if woman i was
born in 1971 or earlier and zero otherwise. The sample consists
of about 6,500 women whose Ti equals one and 15,500 women
whose Ti equals zero.
We construct the longer school year, Di, using the informa-
tion on the year of birth of woman i, her educational attain-
ment, and the number of times she repeated grades. In the
basic speciﬁcations, Di equals one if woman i was in primary,
junior high, or senior high school in the 1978 academic year
and zero otherwise. If a woman was born in 1971 or earlier
and she did not drop out of school before 1978, she experi-
enced the longer school year; but if she was born in 1972 or
later, she did not experience the longer school year. 8 There-
fore, women in the 1971 or older cohorts have Di equals one
if they were still in school in 1978; women in the 1972 or
younger cohorts have Di equals zero.
9 About 53% of women
in the 1960–71 cohorts experienced the longer school year
while none of the women in the 1972–87 cohorts did.
We use the year of birth to deﬁne the longer school year
because, in developing countries like Indonesia, some people
do not know their date of birth, let alone the year in which they
entered primary school. In the IFLS, some people give diﬀerent
birthdates in diﬀerent books within the same wave so that
RAND has to make “best guesses” of these birthdates using
an algorithm to make them as consistent as possible (Strauss,
Witoelar, Sikoki, & Wattie, 2009a). However, we also use the
year of entry into primary school to deﬁne the longer school
year in some speciﬁcations as part of robustness checks.
We use two measures of educational outcomes: (1) highest
grade completed (the years of schooling), and (2) completion
of senior high school, an indicator equals one if a woman com-
pleted senior high school and zero otherwise.
We use four groups of measures of women’s empowerment:
(1) women’s fertility and reproductive health behavior, (2) deci-
sion-making authority, (3) asset ownership, and (4) community
participation. Women’s fertility and reproductive health
behavior include the number of live births, ideal number of
children, and a set of indicators on whether a woman used con-
traception, breastfed youngest child, took iron pills during
pregnancy, or received tetanus injections before pregnancy. 10
Women’s decision-making authority includes a set of indica-
tors equal one if a woman has some say on a particular house-
hold decision (i.e., either she is the sole decision maker or joint
decision maker with her spouse) and zero otherwise. Outcome
measures for asset ownership include a set of indicators equal
one if a woman has some ownership (i.e., either she is the sole
owner or joint owner along with her spouse) of a particular
asset and zero otherwise. Women’s community participation
equals one if a woman participated in a community or govern-
ment activity in the past twelve months and zero otherwise.
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The averages in
Panel A show the younger cohorts are more educated, though
Table 1. Summary statistics
Variable 1960–71 cohorts 1972–87 cohorts T-test 1960–87 cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A: Educational outcomes
Highest grade completed 8.017 9.514 t = 28.73 9.068
(3.728) (2.860) p = 0.000 (3.217)
Completed senior high school 0.341 0.459 t = 14.81 0.422
(0.474) (0.498) p = 0.000 (0.494)
B: Fertility outcomes
Number of live births 2.865 1.546 t = 46.50 1.849
(2.455) (1.041) p = 0.000 (1.590)
Ideal number of children 3.039 2.560 t = 22.13 2.713
(1.695) (1.103) p = 0.569 (1.341)
C: Contraceptive use
Currently using contraception 0.579 0.611 t = 8.34 0.601
(0.493) (0.487) p = 0.000 (0.489)
D: Health practices
Breastfed child 0.970 0.964 t = 1.20 0.967
(0.170) (0.185) p = 0.885 (0.178)
Took iron pills 0.073 0.126 t = 11.115 0.108
(0.259) (0.331) p = 0.000 (0.310)
Received tetanus injection 0.558 0.653 t = 13.81 0.623
(0.496) (0.476) p = 0.000 (0.484)
E: Household decision-making authority
Expenditure
On food eaten at home 0.915 0.921 t = 1.177 0.919
(0.277) (0.268) p = 0.119 (0.271)
On routine purchases 0.938 0.935 t = 0.76 0.936
(0.240) (0.246) p = 0.779 (0.243)
On large expensive purchases 0.902 0.902 t = 0.057 0.902
(0.269) (0.296) p = 0.477 (0.296)
Children
On clothes 0.955 0.962 t = 2.03 0.960
(0.205) (0.188) p = 0.021 (0.194)
On education 0.955 0.965 t = 3.055 0.962
(0.206) (0.182) p = 0.011 (0.190)
On health 0.971 0.972 t = 0.342 0.971
(0.167) (0.164) p = 0.366 (0.165)
Savings
On monthly savings 0.857 0.856 t = 3.576 0.856
(0.349) (0.350) p = 0.069 (0.350)
On money for arisan 0.919 0.932 t = 2.33 0.928
(0.272) (0.250) p = 0.009 (0.258)
Others
On employment of respondent or spouse 0.840 0.770 t = 10.41 0.793
(0.366) (0.420) p = 0.987 (0.404)
On contraceptive use by respondent or spouse 0.969 0.971 t = 0.492 0.970
(0.170) (0.168) p = 0.311 (0.169)
F: Asset ownership
House (including land) 0.981 0.966 t = 3.92 0.974
(0.134) (0.180) p = 0.887 (0.159)
Poultry 0.838 0.792 t = 2.88 0.813
(0.368) (0.405) p = 0.988 (0.389)
Livestock 0.771 0.831 t = 2.201 0.806
(0.420) (0.374) p = 0.014 (0.395)
Vehicle 0.787 0.713 t = 7.02 0.738
(0.409) (0.452) p = 0.996 (0.439)
Household appliances 0.966 0.922 t = 8.44 0.938
(0.180) (0.267) p = 0.899 (0.241)
Savings 0.857 0.856 t = 0.153 0.857
(0.349) (0.350) p = 0.561 (0.350)
Receivables 0.878 0.856 t = 1.157 0.864
(0.327) (0.350) p = 0.876 (0.341)
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (continued)
Variable 1960–71 cohorts 1972–87 cohorts T-test 1960–87 cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jewelry 0.959 0.979 t = 4.567 0.973
(0.196) (0.142) p = 0.000 (0.160)
G: Community participation
Arisan 0.452 0.362 t = 12.564 0.389
(0.497) (0.480) p = 0.897 (0.487)
Community meeting 0.272 0.146 t = 18.11 0.186
(0.445) (0.353) p = 0.879 (0.389)
Village cooperative 0.163 0.089 t = 8.24 0.113
(0.369) (0.285) p = 0.988 (0.317)
Program to improve the village 0.211 0.155 t = 6.74 0.172
(0.408) (0.362) p = 0.789 (0.378)
Voluntary labor 0.271 0.218 t = 6.03 0.235
(0.445) (0.413) p = 0.786 (0.424)
Village savings and loans 0.163 0.095 t = 6.24 0.117
(0.369) (0.293) p = 0.786 (0.321)
Health fund 0.658 0.493 t = 7.97 0.548
(0.474) (0.500) p = 0.956 (0.497)
Women’s association activities 0.285 0.146 t = 19.92 0.190
(0.451) (0.353) p = 0.897 (0.392)
Community weighing post 0.209 0.373 t = 22.66 0.324
(0.406) (0.483) p = 0.000 (0.468)
Notes: The number in each cell is the mean; the standard deviations are in parentheses. The number of women who did not experience the longer school
year in column 1 are 2,000–8,000 (Panel B), 7,000–8,000 (Panel C), 3,400–7,200 (Panel D), 300–3,900 (Panel E), 2,300–9,300 (Panel F); and 2,000–8,000
(Panel G). The number of women who experienced the school year in column 2 are 1,700–4,700 (Panel B), 3,900–4,400 (Panel C), 1,800–3,700 (Panel D),
300–2,300 (Panel E), 1,200–4,600 (Panel F), and 1,200–4,100 (Panel G).
432 WORLD DEVELOPMENTthis is not necessarily caused by the longer school year. (Using
the RD design, we compare women near the cut-oﬀ point
around the 1972 cohort; we do not compare older and younger
cohorts like we do in Table 1). Compared to the 1971 or older
cohorts, women born in 1972 or later (those who did not expe-
rience the longer school year) have on average 1.5 additional
years of education. They are also more likely to complete
senior high school than the older cohorts.
The averages do not indicate the expected eﬀects of the
longer school year on fertility and reproductive health behav-
ior either. Women in the older cohorts have more live births
(panel B); fewer women in the older cohorts use contraception
(panel C), consume iron pills, and receive tetanus injections
prior to marriage (panel D).A
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Figure 1. The ﬁrst-stage regressions. (A) Using the year of birth to deﬁne the lo
the longer schWe do not see strong evidence of the expected eﬀects of the
longer school year on decision-making authority, asset own-
ership, or community participation. Panel E shows that, for
most outcome measures, the older and the younger cohorts
have no practical diﬀerences in women’s decision-making
authority; the diﬀerence in averages for all types of decisions
are statistically insigniﬁcant except decisions on savings,
employment, and children’s clothes and education. Panel F
shows the older and the younger cohorts’ asset ownerships
have mixed patterns depending on the type of assets. Panel
G, however, shows the older cohorts are more likely to par-
ticipate in community activities except the community weigh-
ing post.B 
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(a) First-stage, reduced-form and 2SLS regressions
We now discuss the ﬁrst-stage regressions of the longer
school year on older cohorts, the reduced-form estimates of
the eﬀects of the longer school year on education, and theA
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Table 2. First-stage, reduced-form
A: First-stage regressions
Using the year of birth to deﬁne the longer school year
Older cohorts (1)
Adjusted R2
Number of observations
Using the year of entry to deﬁne the longer school year
Older cohorts (2)
Adjusted R2
Number of observations
B: Reduced-form
Highest grade completed
Older cohorts (3)
Completed senior high school
Older cohorts (4)
C: 2SLS
Highest grade completed
Longer school year (5)
Completed senior high school
Longer school year (6)
Controls
Year of birth cubic polynomial
Age cubic polynomial
Religion indicators
Notes: In Panel A, the number in each cell is the estimate of older cohorts fro
variables. In row 1, the longer school year equals one if a woman was born in 1
longer school year equals one if a woman entered primary school in 1978 or ea
reduced-form estimate of the longer school year deﬁned using the year of bi
parentheses are bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications. The asterisks **corresponding 2SLS estimates of the eﬀects of the longer
school year on education.
Figure 1 illustrates the ﬁrst-stage regressions of the longer
school year on older cohorts. The graphs plot the proportion
of women who experienced the longer school year in the 1978–
79 academic year by year of birth. We deﬁne the longer school
year using the year of birth in panel A and using the year ofB
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(1) (2) (3)
0.858*** 0.858*** 0.888**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.010)
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(0.128) (0.128) (0.122)
0.136*** 0.136*** 0.135***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020)
0.879*** 0.879*** 0.870**
(0.150) (0.150) (0.146)
0.134*** 0.134*** 0.132***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
U U U
U U
U
m a regression of longer school year on older cohorts and a set of control
971 or earlier and was still in school in 1978, zero otherwise; in row 2, the
rlier and was in school in 1978. In Panel B, the number in each cell is the
rth. Panel C reports the corresponding 2SLS estimates. The numbers in
*, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
434 WORLD DEVELOPMENTentry into primary schools in panel B. Both graphs ﬁt a cubic
polynomial of the year of birth that may jump between the
1971 and 1972 cohorts.
To the left of the vertical dash-line in panel A, the propor-
tion of women who experienced the longer school year
increases: About one in ﬁve women in the 1960 cohort to
about four in ﬁve in the 1971 cohort. To the right of the ver-
tical dash line, none of the 1972 or younger cohorts experi-
enced the longer school year by deﬁnition. Panel B shows a
similar picture: The proportion of women who experienced
the longer school year, which we deﬁne using the year of entry
into primary schools, drops from about 0.7 to 0.8 for the older
cohort near the discontinuity to about 0.2 for the younger
cohort. We use this discontinuity in the probability of treat-
ment between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts as an instrumental
variable for the longer school year.
Figure 2 illustrates the reduced-form estimates of the longer
school year, deﬁned using the year of birth, on educational
outcomes. Panel A plots the average number of years of edu-
cation by the year of birth and ﬁts a cubic polynomial of the
year of birth that may jump between the 1971 and 1972
cohorts. The ﬁgure shows educational attainment increases
from about six to seven years in 1960 to ten years in the late
1980s, but the average educational attainment falls by about
one year between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts. Panel B shows
a similar picture for the proportion of women who completed
high school (i.e., twelve years of education). The trend lineA
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Figure 3. The eﬀects on fertility and reproductive health behavior. (A) The numb
proportion of women that breastfeed. (D) The propoincreases overtime but it drops between the 1971 and 1972
cohorts. The fall indicates that the longer school year increases
the likelihood of a woman completing senior high school by
about ten percentage points.
Table 2 presents the estimates from the ﬁrst-stage (Panel A),
reduced-form (Panel B), and second-stage regressions (Panel
C). Each column uses a diﬀerent speciﬁcation: Column 1
includes year of birth cubic polynomial as controls; column
2 adds age cubic polynomial; and column 3 adds a set of reli-
gion indicators (because the data ﬁt an RD design, we do not
expect additional control variables would aﬀect the results). In
row 1, we deﬁne the longer school year using the year of birth;
in row 2, using the year of entry into primary school. In Panels
B and C, we deﬁne the longer school year using the year of
birth, which corresponds with the ﬁrst-stage regressions in
row 1.
In column 1 of row 1, the older cohorts are about 86 per-
centage points more likely to experience the longer school
year, which conﬁrms the discontinuity we see in Figure 1.
(We present bootstrap standard errors with one hundred rep-
lications in parentheses.) We ﬁnd similar estimates when we
include age or religion indicators as additional controls in col-
umns 2 and 3. In row 2, using the year of entry into primary
schools to deﬁne the longer school year, the estimates are 77
percentage points. Again, these estimates conﬁrm the disconti-
nuity in Figure 1. All estimates in Panel A are statistically
signiﬁcant at the 1% level.B
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er of live births. (B) The proportion of women using contraception. (C) The
rtion of women that received tetanus injections.
DOES EDUCATION EMPOWER WOMEN? EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 435Panel B reports the reduced-form estimates of the eﬀects of
the longer school year, which we deﬁne using the year of birth,
on educational attainment and completion of senior high
school. The estimates for educational attainment and complet-
ing senior high school are 0.73 years and 13.5 percentageTable 3. The eﬀects on fertility an
Reduced-form Longer school
(1) (2)
A: Number of children
Number of live births 0.264*** 0.318***
(0.067) (0.0713)
Ideal number of children 0.056 0.066
(0.057) (0.060)
B: Contraceptive Use
Currently using contraception 0.055*** 0.063***
(0.018) (0.021)
C: Health practices
Breastfeed child 0.033** 0.018*
(0.010) (0.012)
Took iron pills 0.014 0.016
(0.012) (0.013)
Received tetanus injection 0.085** 0.098***
(0.017) (0.021)
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a
year of birth cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 2
estimates of the eﬀects of educational attainment or completion of senior high s
standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asterisks ****, **,
Table 4. The eﬀects on dec
Reduced-form Longe
(1)
A: Expenditure
Food eaten at home 0.005
(0.011)
Routine purchases 0.012
(0.010)
Large expensive purchases 0.001
(0.012)
B: Children
Clothes 0.007
(0.008)
Education 0.006
(0.007)
Health 0.012*
(0.006)
C: Savings
Monthly savings 0.034**
(0.010)
Money for arisan 0.033** 
(0.020)
D: Employment of respondent or spouse 0.001
(0.016)
E: Contraceptive use by respondent or spouse 0.012
(0.007)
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a
cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 2SLS estimate.
eﬀects of educational attainment and completion of senior high school on de
replications are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical spoints respectively (column 3), which correspond with the
jumps we see in Figure 2.
Panel C presents the corresponding 2SLS estimates of the
eﬀects of the longer school year on educational outcomes.
The longer school year increases the highest grade completedd reproductive health behavior
The eﬀects of
year Highest grade completed Completing high school
(3) (4)
0.406** 1.977***
(0.105) (0.429)
0.036 0.094
(0.076) (0.371)
0.058** 0.372**
(0.036) (0.165)
0.034** 0.160**
(0.015) (0.070)
0.019 0.108
(0.016) (0.083)
0.078** 0.372**
(0.035) (0.146)
regression of fertility or reproductive health behavior on older cohorts and
SLS estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS
chool on fertility and reproductive health behavior, respectively. Bootstrap
and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
ision-making authority
The eﬀects of
r school year Highest grade completed Completing high school
(2) (3) (4)
0.005 0.017 0.088
(0.013) (0.016) (0.080)
0.014 0.008 0.047
(0.011) (0.015) (0.073)
0.001 0.001 0.022
(0.014) (0.017) (0.087)
0.008 0.012 0.066
(0.009) (0.013) (0.063)
0.007 0.018 0.068
(0.009) (0.012) (0.060)
0.013** 0.019* 0.067
(0.007) (0.011) (0.052)
0.040*** 0.050*** 0.220***
(0.012) (0.019) (0.071)
0.041** 0.073** 0.256**
(0.017) (0.034) (0.112)
0.001 0.034 0.138
(0.018) (0.025) (0.125)
0.014 0.015 0.059
(0.008) (0.011) (0.050)
regression of decision-making authority on older cohorts and year of birth
Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the
cision-making authority, respectively. Bootstrap standard errors with 100
igniﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
436 WORLD DEVELOPMENTby about 0.87 years, a large increase given the average years
of schooling at the time is nine. The longer school year also
increases the likelihood of completing senior high school by
thirteen percentage points—a 31% increase given that 42% of
women completed high schools. Because we use an RD design
as the empirical strategy, as we expect, the estimates are
similar across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations in columns 1–3
regardless of whether we include additional control variables.
(b) Fertility and reproductive health
Figure 3 illustrates some of the reduced-form estimates of the
eﬀects of the longer school year on fertility and reproductive
health practices. The trend lines in the graphs seem to jump
between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts, though the jumps are less
obvious in some. The number of live births, for example,
declines over time, but its trend line rises between the 1971
and 1972 cohorts. The proportion of women who use contra-
ception increases in the 1960s but its trend line falls between
the 1971 and 1972. The same applies to the proportion of
women who breastfeed their children and that of women who
receive tetanus injections, though the fall in the former is
unclear.
The reduced-form and the 2SLS estimates in columns 1–2 of
Table 3 conﬁrm these eﬀects: The longer school year decreases
the number of live births by 0.3 and increases the likelihood0
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Figure 4. The eﬀects on decision-making authority. (A) The proportion of
women who has a say on children’s health decisions. (B) The proportion of
women who has a say on monthly savings.that women use contraception, breastfeed their children, and
receive tetanus injections by six (10%), three (3%), and nine
(14%) percentage points, respectively. There is no evidence
that the longer school year decreases the ideal number of chil-
dren that women want or increases the probability that they
take iron pills: Both estimates are positive, but their standard
errors are as large as the estimates.
Column 3 shows the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates
of the eﬀects of one more of completed education: it reduces
the number of live births by 0.4 and increases the likelihood
of using contraception, breastfeeding, and receiving tetanus
injections by six (10%), three (3%), and eight (12%) percentage
points, respectively. Though education appears to increase
intake of iron pills by two percentage points, the estimate is
statistically insigniﬁcant.
Column 4, which presents the corresponding estimates of
the eﬀects of completing senior high school, shows the results
are consistent with those in columns 2 and 3. Completing
senior high school reduces number of live births by two chil-
dren on average and increases the use of contraception, breast
feeding, and receiving tetanus injections by 37 (60%), 16
(16%), and 37 (57%) percentage points, respectively. The esti-
mate for iron pills is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant.
(c) Household decision-making authority
Table 4 presents the estimates of the eﬀects of education on
women’s household decision-making authority. Each panel
represents a diﬀerent category of decisions: Panel A is about
decisions on household expenditure, Panel B children’s wel-
fare, Panel C household savings, and Panels D and E whether
a respondent or spouse should work or use of contraceptives,
respectively.
The reduced-form and 2SLS estimates in columns 1 and 2
show the longer school year increases the likelihood that
women have some say on routine purchases, children’s educa-
tion and health, monthly savings, employment, and contracep-
tive use. However, only the estimate for monthly savings is
statistically signiﬁcant (four percentage points or 5%).
(Figure 4 illustrates some of the reduced-form estimates.)
The estimates for food eaten at home, children’s clothing,
and money for arisan—a form of rotating savings and credit
association—are negative, but only that of money for arisan
is statistically signiﬁcant; the longer school year reduces the
likelihood that women have a say on arisan by four percentage
points (4%). 11
The equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates in columns 3 and
4 show no evidence that education improves women’s deci-
sion-making authority on expenditure, children’s outcomes,
employment, and contraceptive use; it aﬀects decision making
on household savings, however. One more year of completed
education increases the likelihood of having a say on monthly
savings by ﬁve percentage points (6%); completion of senior
high school increases the likelihood by 22 percentage points
(26%). Furthermore, educational attainment reduces deci-
sion-making authority on arisan money by seven percentage
points (7%); completing twelve years of education reduces it
by 26 percentage points (28%). The other estimates are statis-
tically insigniﬁcant; the standard errors are as large as the esti-
mates.
(d) Asset ownership
Table 5, which presents the eﬀects of education on asset own-
ership, shows the longer school year does not seem to aﬀect
ownership of land, poultry, livestock, vehicles, savings, and
Table 5. The eﬀects on ownership of assets
The eﬀects of
Reduced-form Longer school year Highest grade completed Completing high school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
House and land 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.057
(0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.067)
Poultry 0.027 0.031 0.148 0.257
(0.039) (0.044) (0.294) (20.24)
Livestock 0.048 0.060 0.488 0.511
(0.068) (0.084) (1.880) (0.697)
Vehicles 0.046* 0.054* 0.052 0.200
(0.034) (0.029) (0.046) (0.175)
Household appliances 0.028** 0.032** 0.045** 0.198**
(0.012) (0.013) (0.021) (0.089)
Savings 0.024 0.033 0.022 0.053
(0.041) (0.041) (0.063) (0.183)
Receivables 0.014 0.014 0.004 0.016
(0.027) (0.055) (0.030) (0.205)
Jewelry 0.026** 0.014* 0.021** 0.093**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.046)
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of ownership of assets on older cohorts and year of birth cubic
polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 2SLS estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the eﬀects of
educational attainment and completion of senior high school on ownership of assets, respectively. Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in
parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
Table 6. The eﬀects on community participation
The eﬀects of
Reduced-form Longer school year Highest grade completed Completing high school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Monthly arisan 0.033* 0.038* 0.042 0.213
(0.023) (0.019) (0.026) (0.134)
Community meeting 0.018 0.021 0.001 0.013
(0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.106)
Village cooperative 0.035 0.041 0.040 0.268
(0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.150)
Program to improve the village 0.004 0.005 0.026 0.132
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.106)
Voluntary labor 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.041
(0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.125)
Village savings and loans 0.032 0.037 0.163 0.663*
(0.037) (0.030) (0.111) (0.381)
Health fund 0.061 0.083 0.078 0.270
(0.053) (0.074) (0.169) (0.387)
Women’s association activities 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.027
(0.023) (0.019) (0.027) (0.145)
Community-weighing post 0.050*** 0.058*** 0.111*** 0.539***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.036) (0.170)
Notes: The number in each cell in column 1 is the estimate of older cohorts in a regression of community participation on older cohorts and year of birth
cubic polynomial. Each cell in column 2 is the corresponding 2SLS estimate. Columns 3 and 4 present the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimates of the
eﬀects of educational attainment and completion of senior high school on political or community participation, respectively. Bootstrap standard errors
with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
DOES EDUCATION EMPOWER WOMEN? EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 437receivables. (The estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant; the
estimate for vehicles is signiﬁcant only at the 10% level.) There
is, however, some evidence that education aﬀects ownership of
household appliances and jewelry: The reduced-form and 2SLSestimates in columns 1 and 2 indicate that the longer school
year increases the likelihood of owning household appliances
by about three percentage points (3%) and decreases the likeli-
hood of owning jewelry by about two percentage points (2%).
438 WORLD DEVELOPMENTThe estimates of the eﬀects of education in columns 3 and 4
show that one more year of completed education and complet-
ing senior high school increases the likelihood of owning
household appliances by ﬁve (5%) and 20 (22%) percentage
points, respectively, and reduces the likelihood of owning jew-
elry by two (2%) and nine (9%) percentage points, respectively.
All other estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant.Table 7. Using additional control variables and alternat
Eﬀects of one more year of comp
(1) (2) (3)
Number of live births 0.400*** 0.268*** 0.40
(0.0750) (0.101) (0.10
Received Tetanus Injection 0.075*** 0.119*** 0.075
(0.022) (0.032) (0.02
Currently using Contraception 0.069*** 0.058** 0.069
(0.024) (0.029) (0.02
Breastfeed child 0.031** 0.035*** 0.034
(0.015) (0.013) (0.01
Decision making on monthly savings 0.021 0.042** 0.051
(0.014) (0.020) (0.01
Household appliances 0.027** 0.057** 0.046
(0.013) (0.024) (0.01
Controls
Year of birth quadratic polynomial U
Year of birth cubic polynomial U
Year of birth quartic polynomial U
Age cubic polynomial U
Religion indicators
Notes: The number in each cell is the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of
Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in parentheses. The aste
respectively.
Table 8. Using alternative assignment variable
Dependent variable Eﬀects of one more year of comple
Assignment variable:
year of birth
Assign
ye
Longer school year:
using year of entry
Longe
using
(1)
Number of live births 0.390*** 
(0.098)
Received Tetanus Injection 0.075**
(0.027)
Currently using Contraception 0.058**
(0.029)
Breastfeed child 0.034**
(0.014)
Decision making on monthly savings 0.049*
(0.019)
Household appliances 0.045**
(0.021)
Notes: The number in each cell is the equation-by-equation 2SLS estimate of
senior high school (columns 3 and 4). Each regression includes year of birth
parentheses. The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1%,(e) Community participation
Table 6, which presents the eﬀects of education on commu-
nity participation, shows no evidence that education improves
community participation for monthly arisan meetings, com-
munity meetings, participating in village cooperatives, pro-
grams to improve the village, voluntary labor, village loansive polynomial functions of the assignment variable
leted education Eﬀects of completing senior high school
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
5** 0.369*** 2.313*** 1.089** 1.969** 1.759***
3) (0.109) (0.414) (0.469) (0.493) (0.515)
** 0.079** 0.051** 0.624** 0.382** 0.392**
7) (0.041) (0.129) (0.158) (0.141) (0.154)
** 0.067** 0.512** 0.371** 0.434** 0.422**
8) (0.032) (0.142) (0.153) (0.151) (0.163)
** 0.039** 0.175* 0.166** 0.163** 0.181**
3) (0.016) (0.093) (0.070) (0.071) (0.080)
** 0.046** 0.099* 0.162** 0.222*** 0.213**
9) (0.020) (0.057) (0.069) (0.072) (0.082)
** 0.043** 0.143* 0.262** 0.201** 0.201**
2) (0.020) (0.074) (0.109) (0.089) (0.092)
U
U U U
U
U U U
U U
the eﬀects of educational attainment or completion of senior high school.
risks ***, **, and * indicate statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
s and deﬁnitions of the longer school year
ted of education Eﬀects of completing senior high school
ment variable:
ar of entry
Assignment variable:
year of birth
Assignment variable:
year of entry
r school year:
year of entry
Longer school year:
using year of entry
Longer school year:
using year of entry
(2) (3) (4)
0.545*** 1.934*** 3.157***
(0.153) (0.479) (0.883)
0.085*** 0.383** 0.671**
(0.028) (0.139) (0.243)
0.032 0.375** 0.238
(0.027) (0.152) (0.245)
0.034 0.150** 0.299
(0.022) (0.075) (0.216)
0.051** 0.219*** 0.338**
(0.021) (0.071) (0.138)
0.035** 0.198** 0.212**
(0.018) (0.089) (0.108)
the eﬀects of educational attainment (columns 1 and 2) or completion of
cubic polynomial. Bootstrap standard errors with 100 replications are in
5%, and 10%, respectively.
DOES EDUCATION EMPOWER WOMEN? EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 439and savings programs, health fund, and women’s association
activities; all estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant at conven-
tional level of signiﬁcance. The longer school year, however
increases the likelihood of a woman participating in Posyandu
or the community weighing posts—community centers that
the government of Indonesia sets up to provide pre- and post-
natal healthcare for women and infants—by about six percent-
age points (16%).
(f) Robustness checks
We do a number of robustness checks: (1) we include alter-
native polynomial functions of the assignment variable and
additional control variables, (2) we use alternative assignment
variables and deﬁnitions of the longer school year, and (3) we
do some falsiﬁcation tests.
Table 7 presents the eﬀects of education on key outcome
measures using additional controls and alternative polynomial
functions of the assignment variable. Columns 1 and 5 include
year of birth quadratic polynomial; columns 2 and 6 year of
birth quartic polynomial; columns 3 and 7 age cubic polyno-
mial; and columns 4 and 8 both age cubic polynomial and reli-
gion indicators. Overall the results are robust; both the signs
and magnitude of the estimates are similar to those in the basic
results.
Table 8 presents the eﬀects of education using alternative
assignment variables and diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the longer
school year. Columns 1 and 3 use the year of birth as the
assignment variable and deﬁne the longer school year using
the year of entry into primary schools; columns 2 and 4 use
the year of entry as the assignment variable and deﬁne the
longer school year using the year of entry. Overall, the results
are robust except for a few cases in which we use the year of
entry into primary schools as the assignment variable. Some
of the estimates in columns 2 and 4 are statistically insigniﬁ-
cant, which may be caused by measurement errors in the year
of entry to primary schools we describe in the empirical strat-
egy and data section. Nevertheless, the signs and the magni-
tude of the estimates are similar to those in the basic results.
Table 9 presents some falsiﬁcation tests to see whether there
are other discontinuities between the 1971 and 1972 cohorts.
No discontinuities in individual characteristics indicatesTable 9. Falsiﬁcation tests
Dependent variable (1) (2)
Age 0.081 0.020
(0.020) (0.023)
Born in rural area 0.083 0.096*
(0.043) (0.050)
Lived in rural area when twelve years old 0.029 0.036
(0.044) (0.049)
When twelve years old biological
parents were married
0.045 0.052*
(0.025) (0.028)
Biological parents live in household 0.029 0.035
(0.018) (0.021)
Variable used to deﬁne longer school year
Year of birth U
Year of entry U
Notes: The number in each cell is the 2SLS estimate of the longer school
year, which is deﬁned using year of birth or year of entry. Each regression
includes the year of birth cubic polynomial. Bootstrap standard errors
with 100 replications are in parentheses. The asterisk * indicates statistical
signiﬁcance at 10% level.treatment (the longer school year) near the cut-oﬀ point is
as-if random. If that is the case, we can rule out the possibility
that these factors cause the discontinuities in women’s empow-
erment, which increases our conﬁdence that we have identiﬁed
the eﬀects of education on women’s empowerment. We con-
sider the age of women, whether they were born in rural areas,
whether they lived in rural areas when they were twelve years
old, whether their biological parents were married when they
were twelve years old, and whether their biological parents
are currently living in the same household. In column 1, we
deﬁne the longer school year using the year of birth; in column
2 using the year of entry to primary schools.
All estimates are statistically insigniﬁcant at conventional
level of signiﬁcance; we do not ﬁnd evidence that there are dis-
continuities in these variables between the 1971 and 1972
cohorts that may compromise identiﬁcation using the RD
design.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Education reduces women’s fertility, increases contraceptive
use, and promotes reproductive health practices. One more
year of completed education reduces women’s number of live
births by 0.4 on average; it increases women’s likelihood of
using contraception, breastfeeding children, and receiving tet-
anus injections by 10%, 3%, and 12%, respectively. Complet-
ing senior high school reduces the number of live births by
two children and increases the likelihood of using contracep-
tion, breastfeeding children, and receiving tetanus injections
by 60%, 16%, and 57%, respectively.
There is no evidence that education improves women’s deci-
sion-making authority (except on savings), women’s assets
ownership (except that of household appliances and jewelry),
or community participation (except visiting the community
weighing post), at least along the measures that we examine
in this paper. In any case, most women in Indonesia have some
say on expenditure and children’s decisions and almost all own
houses or jewelry (see Panel F of Table 1), which perhaps
drives the insigniﬁcant results. Most women do not participate
in community activities, in particular women in the younger
cohorts who are more educated on average (see Panel G of
Table 1). Therefore, it may be diﬃcult to identify the eﬀects
of education on women’s decision-making authority, asset
ownership, or community participation in Indonesia using
the measures that we have in the IFLS even if education
matters.
Among the signiﬁcant results, one more year of completed
education and completing senior high school increase the like-
lihood that women have a say on monthly savings by 6% and
26%, respectively; they reduce the likelihood that women have
decision-making authority on arisan money by 7% and 28%,
respectively. One more year of completed education and com-
pleting senior high school also increase the likelihood of own-
ing household appliances by 5% and 22%, and reduce
ownership of jewelry by 2% and 9%. Education increases
women’s authority on household savings and ownership of
household appliances perhaps because educated women are
more likely to work and, therefore, control their own income
and purchase assets necessary for their households’ daily activ-
ities. Though education gives women some say on savings,
including on moving away from arisan as a means of saving,
there is no evidence that education increases women’s
ownership of savings. One more year of completed education
and completion of senior high school also increase the likeli-
hood of participating in community weighing post. Because
440 WORLD DEVELOPMENTcommunity-weighing post is related to women’s reproductive
health, this result is similar to the eﬀects of education on
women’s fertility and reproductive health behavior in Table 3.
These ﬁndings are in line with the bargaining theory of
Lundberg and Pollak (1993), Manser and Brown (1980), and
McElroy and Horney (1981). Education is a threat option that
increases women’s bargaining power within households; it
endows women with knowledge, power, and resources to
make life choices that improve their welfare. More educated
women have fewer children, use contraception, have better
reproductive health practices, and have some say on house-
hold decision making—education empowers women to choose
the best for themselves and to bargain with their husbands on
how to allocate resources within their households.
Our results are in line with the empirical literature on the
eﬀects of education on women’s empowerment; they also sit
within the broader empirical literature on how women’s threat
options empower women. Mocan and Cannonier (2012), for
example, ﬁnd education improves Sierra Leonean women’s
attitudes toward women’s health and domestic violence,
reduces their number of desired children, and increases their
likelihood of using contraceptives and getting tested for AIDS;
Breierova and Duﬂo (2004) and Osili and Long (2008) also
ﬁnd education reduces women’s fertility in Indonesia and
Nigeria, respectively. On women’s threat option literature,
Panda and Agarwal (2005) ﬁnd ownership of land reduces risk
of marital violence in India; Hashemi, Shuler, and Riley (1996)
ﬁnd access to microﬁnance increases women’s mobility, deci-
sion-making authority, ownership of productive assets, and
awareness and participation in public campaigns and protests
in Bangladesh.
Our ﬁndings seem to have some external validity in other
time and places as the similarity of our results with those in
the empirical literature suggests; moreover, the natural exper-
iment we use has a good research design. One, the longer
school year aﬀected most people in the relevant cohorts, which
provides estimates that are close to the population-average
eﬀects. Two, the government of Indonesia extended the term
length haphazardly and it provided inadequate educational
inputs, which indicates that even a small improvement in edu-
cation systems increases women’s educational attainment in
developing countries and empowers these women. Three,
Indonesia’s term length is longer than many other developing
countries’, which suggests that women in other countries may
gain from term-length extensions or other modest changes in
education policies.
Our results suggest that education in Indonesia aﬀects only
certain, not all, aspects of women’s lives (see also Beegle,Frankenberg, and Thomas (1998), Hashemi et al. (1996),
and Kishor (1995)). On the one hand, education improves
women’s health and wellbeing, outcomes that depend on
access to information and services, which education is likely
to aﬀect directly. Education increases women’s stock of
knowledge, which allows them to gain literacy skills, enables
them to process information, and develops their cognitive
behavior that shapes how they interact with others. Therefore,
when a woman is educated, she is able to read and learn about
the risks of unprotected sex, do better family planning, and
take better care of herself (or get help when necessary) during
pregnancy (Duﬂo, 2012). On the other hand, education may be
insuﬃcient to change deeply rooted societal attitudes so that it
may not improve outcomes that require transformations of
gender relations such as decision-making authority, asset own-
ership, and community participation. Many parts of Indonesia
are still governed by adat or local norms (Kevane & Levine,
2003), which may give husbands rights to ask their wives to
be housewives or to make household decisions by themselves.
Moreover, patrilineal kinship in Indonesia often requires
women to move into the homes of their husbands after mar-
riage and give them limited inheritance rights (Rammohan &
Johar, 2009).
Our ﬁndings imply publicly funded education (the use of
taxpayers’ money and government resources to ﬁnance
public schools) in middle-income countries like Indonesia
has higher rates of returns than previous estimates in the
literature because education not only produces skilled
workers and informed voters, but also empowers women.
Public education may increase contraceptive use (which will
limit unwanted pregnancies), reduce fertility rates (with bet-
ter family planning), and promote women’s health prac-
tices. As women become more educated, their children
may also do better because the women, among others, have
their children breastfed and immunized, which reduces
child malnutrition and mortality rates. 12 Moreover, women
will have more say on how to allocate resources within
their households, which may funnel more resources to chil-
dren’s health and education. 13 Therefore, to empower
women, because of the higher rates of returns of education,
governments of developing countries like Indonesia’s should
consider expanding and improving their education systems
further.
In this paper, we do not explore the mechanisms through
which education empower women; we do not examine whether
education aﬀects other aspects of women’s welfare such as
domestic violence or freedom of movement. These questions
could be perhaps explored in future research.NOTES1. Garikipati (2008), however, does not ﬁnd that microﬁnance increases
women’s asset ownership in India; she ﬁnds that women use their loans to
increase household assets and income, not to ensure co-ownership of
assets for themselves.
2. These papers use, among others, school construction programs,
compulsory schooling policies, and school entry policies as instruments;
see Breierova and Duﬂo (2004), Osili and Long (2008), Leon (2004), and
Mocan and Cannonier (2012).
3. Panda and Agarwal (2005) analyze women’s empowerment in a
middle-income country, India; but Indonesia has a diﬀerent cultural and
social environment. We are not aware of papers that examine the eﬀects ofeducation on women’s empowerment in Indonesia except Gallaway and
Bernasek (2004) who analyze correlations between literacy on women’s
labor force participation.
4. Indonesian school children spent about 240 days in schools in an
academic year, which includes three four-month semesters. The longer
school year, therefore, increased the number of days spent in schools by
about 120 days.
5. Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) introduce this empirical strategy.
See also Lee and Lemieux (2010), Imbens and Lemieux (2008), and Hahn,
Todd, and van Der Klaauw (2001). See McCrary and Royer (2011) for a
paper on the eﬀects of female education on fertility using RD designs.
DOES EDUCATION EMPOWER WOMEN? EVIDENCE FROM INDONESIA 4416. See Strauss, Witoelar, Sikoki, and Wattie (2009b) for a description of
the survey.
7. Only ever-married women were asked questions on women’s fertility
and contraceptive use; therefore, the sample size ranges from about 3,300
to 10,700 women in some speciﬁcations, which depends on the measure of
outcome we use. Only currently married women were asked questions on
women’s decision-making authority; therefore, the sample size for
decision-making authority ranges from about 4,300 to 9,300 depending
on the measure of outcome.
8. Most children in Indonesia enter primary schools in the year they are
seven years old; in our basic speciﬁcations, we assume that women born in
1972 or later entered primary school in 1979 or later and, therefore, did
not experience the longer school year.
9. We illustrate how we deﬁne Di as follows. Suppose a woman was
born in 1970 and entered primary school in 1977. For her to
experience the longer school year in 1978, the sum of the number oftimes she repeated grades and her years of completed education
should be at least two years in which case her Di equals one;
otherwise it equals zero.
10. The number of live births is the number of children a woman has
given birth to in her lifetime, some of whom may have passed away; the
ideal number of children is the number of children a woman would have if
she could choose. Currently using contraceptives is an indicator equals one
if a woman at the time of the survey was using a form of contraception to
prevent or postpone a pregnancy and zero otherwise.
11. Arisan is one of the oldest and most widespread forms of rural
ﬁnancial institutions in Indonesia (Hospes, 1996).
12. In Indonesia, for example, 28% of children below the age of ﬁve are
underweight; 45% of them are malnourished (WHO, 2012).
13. Thomas (1994), for example, ﬁnds ﬁnances controlled by women
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